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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper studies determinants of MPs expense claims in Parliament using the data 
released under the freedom of information act in 2004. Using a multiple regression 
framework, we correlate expenses with three sets of variables: constituency 
characteristics, party affiliation and individual characteristics. We also look at the ratio of 
parliamentary expenses claimed to votes cast in parliament as a crude measure of value 
for money. We use the results to reflect on two views of the motivation of MPs, the 
public Choice view and the public service view. 
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1 Introduction
In an era of greater calls for transparency and accountability in government,
coupled with increasing media activism, the public and private lives of public
o¢ cials receive ever greater scrutiny. One facet of this is the attention paid
to the remuneration direct and indirect that such o¢ cials receive. A case
in point is the scheme that provides expense allowances to MPs in the U.K.
which supplement their salaries. On the 21st of October 2004, just before the
Freedom of Information Act come into force, the House of Commons made
public the detailed accounts of individual Members of Parliaments expense
claims for the rst time.
This increase in transparency led to a urry of newspaper articles and
opinion polls which did their best to cast MPs in an unfavourable light.
For example, the Daily Mail was quick to use the label Westminster gravy
train to describe such allowances.1 Outrage was caused by both the to-
tal amounts and a number of allegedly unjustied claims. Several cabinet
members, for example, claimed the allowance for a London home, despite
receiving grace-and- favour accommodation by the government. Opinion
polls taken immediately after this coverage demonstrated a negative public
perception of such expenses.2
Sir Archy Kirkwood MP, spokesman for the House of Commons Commis-
sion the body that approved the publication mounted a robust defence
arguing:
[publishing MPs expenses was] a signicant step towards
openness and accountability that would allow taxpayers to see
how their money was being spent.... These tables show essen-
tial expenses needed by politicians to operate in a fast-moving,
high-pressure environment. Members are like 659 individual small
businesses, working under an ever-increasing load and more com-
plex environment. They now deal with issues, and communicate
in ways unheard of a few years ago. They require more back-up
sta¤, more computer resources, and more allowances to enable
them to travel back and forth to Parliament, living away from
1"So is your MP worth Pounds 175,000?", Daily Mail, 22nd October 2004
2For example, a YouGov poll carried out for the Mail on Sunday on October 22-23
2004 found that 82% of respondents believed that MPs were allowed to claim too much
by way of allowances see http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/DBD040101010_2.pdf
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home for days at a time, while keeping in touch with the prob-
lems and issues of their constituents.
Individual MPs singled out as high claimers similarly defended the
legitimacy of these expenses, one claiming that this is not about trousering
a lot of money. This is about the money it takes to do the job.3 Claire
Curtis-Thomas, who topped the list with expenses of £ 168, 889 said: we
dont know whether to be worried or to be honoured. We have got eight
people working in our o¢ ce, and during the course of last year visited all
33,000 homes in the constituency and held street surgeries.4 The general
point is that high expenses might simply be a reection of the need to provide
MPs with the resources needed to deliver a high quality service to the nation
and their constituents.
This paper conducts a statistical analysis of MPsexpenses using three
years of data between 2001 to 2004. The analysis has three goals. First, we
assess the relationship between expense claims and structural features of the
constituencies they represent, such as the distance from London, the size of
the constituency and the income level of constituents. In trying to assess
which MPs are really high spenders, it is necessary to control for these
observable characteristics of constituencies. Second, we examine whether
di¤erences in political circumstances a¤ect expense claims. This includes
party e¤ects, the marginality of the constituency and the party the MP rep-
resents. Since these variables are not structural, they are likely to represent
behavioural e¤ects, i.e. decisions made by MPs to a¤ect re-election chances,
to serve constituents better or to further self-interest. Third, we look at
how personal characteristics a¤ect expense claims. These include age, ed-
ucational background and how long an MP has served for. The last two
variables represent largely behavioural factors and give us further insight
into the choices MPs make. By using a multiple regression framework, we
are able to look at the relative signicance of these di¤erent factors while
controlling for the others.
We then look at whether MPs have announced they will retire at the
next election. The U.S. literature on legislators performance has put a
lot of weight on such announced retirements as a means of testing whether
legislators are inclined to shirkwhen they are about to step down from
3Stephen Pound, Ealing North MP, reported in Average MPs expenses cost taxpayer
pounds 118,000, The Guardian, 22nd October 2004.
4UKs costliest MP says she is worth every penny, The Guardian, October 22, 2004.
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elected o¢ ce. If what keeps an MP honest is the prospect of re-election
then this should lead to more expenses being claimed. If such MPs perceive
less of a need to invest in constituency service, then announcing retirement
should be correlated with lower expense claims.
Finally, we turn to particular performance measures of MPs based on
their attendance record in Parliament in addition to their expense claims.
We compute the amount of expenses that a MP claims relative to the number
of votes they cast in Parliament over the period in question. This cost per
vote varies signicantly across MPs, reecting a combination of variations in
attendance and in expenses claimed. The former varies signicantly with a
few MPs attending fewer than 10% of possible divisions while others attend
more than 90% of the time. Retiring MPs are signicantly less likely to vote
in Parliament.
Using cost per vote as a measure of value for money, we nd that there are
di¤erences across parties and that the cost per vote varies with both age and
experience. More experienced MPs charge considerably more in expenses for
every vote they cast in Parliament; however, for a given experience, younger
MPs are more expensive. While acknowledging that this is only a single
dimension of MP performance, it is a relevant consideration for the public at
large who have to fund Parliament out of the taxes they pay.
These discussions go to the heart of more general debates about stan-
dards in public life and the motivations of politicians. On the one hand is a
tradition that emphasizes the motives for holding o¢ ce as based on an ethic
of public service where representatives are faithful, honest and competent.
Such competence is enhanced if a legislature is adequately professionalized,
which means providing suitable support for research and constituency ser-
vice. On the other, politicians are viewed in the Public Choice tradition
as self-interested using the state as vehicle for achieving private ends.5 The
provision of expenses is then viewed as just another dimension of rent-seeking
behaviour.
Overall, the results provide qualied support for a relatively benign view
of MPs expenses. The main factors that shape decisions in a predictable way
are structural features of constituencies. However, we also nd that political
characteristics and personal characteristics matter some of the time. Having
5This view has greatly inuenced studies of U.S. Congressional politics following the
classic study by Mayhew (1974) which cast Congressman as single-minded seekers of
re-election(page 5).
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decided to step down as an MP a¤ects the decisions both to claim expenses
and to vote in Parliament.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses the data and some basic facts. Section three discusses the empirical
method and results. Section four o¤ers some concluding comments.
2 Background and Data
The package o¤ered to MPs consists of a salary and a series of allowances
aimed to enable their attendance at Westminster and to improve their ef-
fectiveness as public servants. The basic MPs salary is around £ 59,000
per annum.6 This amount is supplemented by expense allowances up to
£ 77,000 on sta¤ costs and nearly £ 20,000 on running their o¢ ces. If their
constituency is outside inner London they can also claim more than £ 20,000
pounds to cover the cost of a second home. In addition, there is a budget
for IT support of £ 3000 as well as coverage of certain incidental expenses.
Travel expenses between Westminster and the constituency are reimbursed
at 56.1p a mile7 which is somewhat more generous than the Inland Revenue
recommended rate of 40p a mile. Moreover, some private companies pay only
25p a mile.
MPs for neighbouring constituencies often claimed very di¤erent amounts.
MP Anne Picking from East Lothian, for example, claimed £ 39,744 in travel
expenses, while neighbouringMPDavid Hamilton, fromMid-Lothian, claimed
£ 18,833. Analogous, apparently inexplicable, di¤erences can be found across
all types of claims.8
6Members of the government received additional salaries.
7More precisely, MPs could claim 56.1p per mile for up to 20,000 miles (25.9p thereafter)
when travelling on parliamentary business in 2003-2004. There was also a bicycle allowance
of 7.2p per mile. If using public transport, MPs were reimbursed rst class train tickets
and ights. It was also possible to be reimbursed the expenses of up to three visits to EU
institutions or to national parliaments of EU members. To the total MP travel spending
variable, that is reported as Member Travel, we add the Members Sta¤ travel, which
consists in expenses incurred by the Member and all his/her employees when travelling
between Westminster and the constituency. There are limits to the number of such trips
that are reimbursed: these consisted in 18 single journeys per year until December 2003,
and in 30 single journeys for the period from 1 January 2004 to 31 March 2005.
8The statistical analysis includes regional indicator variables to account for basic re-
gional di¤erences in transport and living costs.
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Our main source of information is the list of expenses claimed by MPs and
published under the Freedom of Information Act (2000) in October 2004 by
the House of Commons. These consist of three data sets, one for each scal
year from 2001-2002 to 2003-2004. Since we do not have any time variation
in other data, our analysis averages the observations across the three years,
to smooth possible idiosyncrasies due to particular circumstances.
We exclude MPs from Northern Ireland from our analysis. The political
situation has certainly many peculiarities there if compared with the rest
of the country. More importantly, however, the four MPs from Sinn Fein
claimed expenses in line with other MPs despite not taking their seats in
Westminster. The specicity of this situation, whatever opinion one has on
the matter, suggests we should exclude these few observations from Northern
Ireland from our regressions. In addition, we have excluded constituencies
that have had by-elections (and therefore changed their MP) during the pe-
riod under consideration. This leaves us with a sample of 638 MPs.
Table 1 gives the summary statistics for our data. Averaged over the
three years for which we have data, the median (and mean) amount of ex-
penses claimed is just under £ 106,000 with a standard deviation of around
£ 12,000. Regional di¤erences are signicant with spending levels being
lowest in London (an average of £ 98,000) and highest in the south, north,
northwest and Scotland (£ 110,000).9 From these data we know the con-
stituency and the party of each MP. While there are suggestive di¤erences
in allowances claimed by di¤erent party members, they are not statistically
signicant.10
The analysis uses allowances disaggregated into sub-categories. This
makes sense since something like travel seems likely to be driven mainly by
distance from Westminster whereas others are a¤ected more by an MPs be-
haviour. We focus separately on travel expenses as well as on sta¤ expenses
(the largest category with a mean value of nearly £ 59,000), which also at-
tracted serious attention. We also focus on expenses that have been relatively
less under the spotlight, i.e. expenses net of sta¢ ng, travels and London ac-
commodation expenses. This residual variable, that we will refer to as "other
9A detailed description of all variables, as well as summary statistics, are reported in
the Appendix.
10This shows the importance of using proper statistical methods rather than the type
of casual empiricism that is typical of journalistic accounts. For example, The Sun, trum-
peted that it also emerged that 16 of the top 20 with their snouts in the trough are
Laboursuggesting that party di¤erences might be signicant.
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expenses", includes what in the original data set released by the Parliament
is indicated by Incidental Expenses Provision (IEP), Centrally Purchased
Stationery, Postage, Centrally Provided Computer Equipment and Other
Costs.11 These expenses are less obviously linked to specic observable needs
and are therefore more manipulable: we think that analysing them separately
can provide useful insight into the behaviour of MPs.
We regress expenses on a number of MPscovariates that try to capture
the characteristics of their constituency, some basic political variables and
their own individual characteristics. This analysis reveals a number of signif-
icant patterns. However, we will argue that focusing only on expenses, as the
press has done, can be misleading. After all, allowances serve, in principle,
to facilitate the work of MPs and to ensure a level playing eld across MPs
from di¤ering constituencies. We should take into account the amount of
work delivered by an MP before expressing any normative statement. There
is obviously no perfect measure to assess the overall performance of an MP
and the services delivered to the constituents. Here, we look at the rate
of attendance at parliamentary meetings.12 Although MPs have to full
numerous tasks, one of their main duties is to represent their constituents
in Parliament and, therefore, to participate in parliamentary debates, other
proceedings and voting processes. In the period we study, MPs attended on
average only 69% of possible divisions. However, there is considerable vari-
ation across MPs. We show that the variation in parliamentary attendance
can be explained by many of the variables that also explain expenses claims.
We argue that, rather than using expense claims, a better measure of how
well public money has been spent is to measure the cost per vote in parlia-
ment. This is obtained by dividing the total expenses claimed over the three
year period by the total number of votes. The average cost per vote is £ 556
with considerable variation across MPs. By using this measure we conclude
that only four variables matter in this crude measure of "value for money":
party a¢ liation, cabinet membership, age and seniority in parliament.
11IEP meets the costs of the MPs o¢ ce or surgery (including accommodation, equip-
ment etc.), as well as work commissioned or other services, including some travel and
communication expenses. Under Otherwe have a number of possible costs, including
temporary secretarial allowance (which pays for additional help when members of sta¤
are absent because of sickness or maternity leave), contributions to security costs for the
o¢ ce etc.
12Attendance is measured by the number of votes (divisions) cast in the period consid-
ered.
7
Table 1 contains information about the constituencies and characteristics
of MPs. The average age of an MP is 50 and average experience eight years.
It is striking that 26% of MPs are Oxbridge educated. Nearly 18% are
women. Around 13% stepped down at the end of the Parliament elected in
2001.
Politicians often seek to be re-elected. Indeed, the main sanction avail-
able to voters who are unhappy with their MP is to vote them out. If this
mechanism has any force, we should expect MPs to be less well-behaved
once it is clear they will not stand again. At the other end, there is a view
that says elections are mainly a selection device to sort in publicly-spirited
politicians. If it succeeds in this task, there should be no di¤erence in their
performance once the electoral sanction is removed.
A substantial literature has grown up testing these ideas and looking at
whether politicians behave di¤erently after they have decided to retire from
politics. Lott and Bronars (1993) analyse Congressional voting data from
1975-90, and nd no signicant change in voting patterns in a representatives
last term in o¢ ce. They use this to argue that selection works well for the
U.S. Congress, leading to individuals who are well aligned with constituents
interests. Further evidence on the U.S. Congress is found in McArthur and
Marks (1988), who observe Congressional behaviour in a lame duck session
of Congress: in post-election sessions, members who have not been re-elected
are at times called upon to vote on legislation before the swearing in of
the new Congress. They nd that retiring representatives were signicantly
more likely in 1982 to vote against automobile domestic content legislation
than were members who were returning. Besley and Case (1995) nd that
policies are di¤erent in states when U.S. state Governors cannot stand again
for election because of the imposition of term limits.
We are not aware of any previous study that addresses these issues for the
U.K.. In this context, the role of parties is much more important than in the
U.S.. Constituency pressures instead are probably less important. Hence, we
might expect party discipline to override any tendency to shirktowards the
end of a political career. Here, we analyse whether MPs who announced their
intention to step down at the end of the Parliament behave di¤erently from
those that will face re-election. We nd that retiring MPs both claim fewer
expenses and vote less. This second result is consistent with some previous
ndings in the U.S.; Lott (1987) and Lott and Reed (1989) nd that US House
members miss more votes in their last term in o¢ ce, although they do not
change their voting patterns. Our nding that retiring MPs spend less is the
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opposite of what has been found for the US Congress by Parker and Powers
(2002), who nd that retiring legislators spend substantially more money in
foreign travel than their colleagues. We do not nd any e¤ect of retirement
on the cost per vote. This suggests that the reduction in expenses claims is
explained by lower attendance rather than by increased rent-seeking.
Our results are also relevant to the small literature on the e¤ectiveness
of legislators. The main measures of e¤ectiveness used are typically related
to "entrepreneurship" (i.e. the number and relevance of bills sponsored by a
legislator), as in Shiller (1995) andWawro (2002) or to subjective assessments
of legislators made by journalists and lobbyists, as in the works of DeGregorio
(1997) and Padroi Miguel and Snyder (2004). This literature points clearly
to the role of seniority and party a¢ liation as important explanatory variables
of e¤ectiveness: more senior members and members of the majority party
tend to be more e¤ective legislators. In their analysis of the North Carolina
House of Representatives, Padroi Miguel and Snyder (2004) show that the
impact of seniority can be due to both selection and learning by doing. Our
results on the U.K. parliament conrm the importance of party a¢ liation
and seniority although, in our case (and possibly because of the di¤erent
measure of e¤ectiveness that we adopt), more experienced MPs turn out to
be less cost e¤ective for citizens.
Looking at MPsexpenses brings into sharp relief the issue of what is
socially valuable about what they do. There is a large literature on con-
stituency service by British MPs and its determinants. One of the main
debates has been whether individuals MPs have any incentive to invest in
their electorates given the importance of parties on voting decisions. Cain,
Ferejohn and Fiorina [1984], argue persuasively that the British system does
result in an increase in their personal vote. They study this using polling
data and based on interviews with MPs. It is widely agreed in this and
other studies that holding regular surgeries to deal with constituents needs
is a key part of such service.13 Moreover, there appears to be considerable
heterogeneity in the propensity to do so (over time and space). Engaging in
correspondence with constituents and with ministers on their behalf is also
an important aspect of such service. Postage charges by MPs may be a
proxy for such activity.
13See Norton and Wood (1993) for an excellent overview of constituency service by MPs.
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3 Empirical Method
The purpose of this study is not to establish whether there have been abuses
of the allowance system. Only careful investigation of individual claims could
ever identify these. Rather, we ask if there is any systematic correlation be-
tween the observed expenses and specic characteristics of the constituencies
and/or of the individual MPs. We are interested to see how much such ex-
penses claims can be justied by objective needs (for example the distance
from Westminster), by activism and service to constituents (in the form of
voting in the House of Commons), or by other types of political and electoral
motivations.
Our basic empirical specication is as follows:
amcr = r + ycr + xmcr + zmcr + "mcr (1)
where amcr is the allowance claimed by MP m in constituency c in region
r. We include region dummy variables r, constituency characteristics ycr;
political variables xcmr and individual MP characteristics zmcr. We estimate
this equation using OLS with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity of
an arbitrary kind.
We consider rst total average expenses for the period 2001-04. We then
take a closer look at travel and sta¤ expenses, that attracted serious criti-
cism by most of the press. Most of the travels of MPs are made between
Westminster and their electoral constituency: thus, the main explanatory
variable for travel expense claims should be the distance of the constituency
fromWestminster: for this purpose we have calculated road distances in miles
as reported by the Automobile Association. Sta¤ expenses should instead
mainly be driven by the local cost of labour, assuming that most employees
would come from the same constituency of the MP. The average constituency
income should represent an important explanatory variable. However, sta¤
expenses show limited variation when compared to other categories, with
most MPs tending to spend amounts close to the maximum allowance. We
then turn to the "other expenses" variable described in the previous section.
As opposed to the previous cases, there are no obvious variables to explain
the variability of such spending categories, which probably makes it easier
for MPs to use them either as personal perks or to deliver a better service to
the constituents. In either case, the usage of such claims should make clearer
the motivations of the politicians.
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To test whether the prospect of re-election a¤ects the behaviour of current
MPs we will then consider the following specication:
amcr = r + ycr + xmcr + 1zmcr + 2rmcr + "mcr (2)
where rmcr is a dummy variable equal to 1 for MPs who, at any point during
the legislature, announced their intention not to stand at the next general
election. If expense claiming is driven by the desire to pocket public money
then 2 should be positive, since the claimant will not face the same sort of
public scrutiny as a standing candidate. A negative sign of 2 would instead
signal a relationship between expense claiming and the desire to enhance the
perspectives of re-election, which could be related with the quality of the
service delivered to the constituents.
We analyse MPs participation in parliamentary a¤airs by estimating an
equation of the form
pmcr = r + ycr + xmcr + 1zmcr + 2rmcr + umcr (3)
where pmcr is the participation ratio in Westminster meetings, measured by
using parliamentary voting records. If pmcr is equal to 1 then MP m in
constituency c and region r cast his/her vote in all bills passed during the
period considered, if it is zero then he/she never cast a vote. Our measure
of the cost per vote, bmcr, dened as (amcr=pmcr) multiplied by the total
number of divisions held. We therefore run a regression of the form:
bmcr = r + ycr + xmcr + 1zmcr + 2rmcr + umcr: (4)
This equation combines information about attendance and expenses together.
For example, retiring MPs may attend less and claim fewer expenses in which
case they will not be more expensivein cost per vote. There are arguably
other ways to measure the performance of elected representatives and we
certainly will not claim that the work delivered by an MP is all captured by
the number of votes cast in Parliament. Nevertheless, our measure captures
an important aspect of parliamentary work and has the advantage of being
easily and objectively measurable. More work should certainly be devoted to
construct better measures of e¤ectiveness but we believe that, using the cost
per vote, we can start providing an important insight on the performance of
MPs.
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4 Results
4.1 Total average expenses
Table 2 reports the regression results when the dependent variable is total
average expenses in the 3 years considered. The specication in the rst
column includes only constituency characteristics, namely the distance from
Westminster, the average income in the county and the size of the electorate.
As expected, the distance has a positive and signicant sign while both in-
come and size turn out to be insignicant.
Column 2 introduces political variables. Party a¢ liation is not corre-
lated with the total expenses claimed by MPs. Coming from a marginal
constituency (i.e. where the distance between the winner and the runner up
in the 2001 election was less than 10%) is also uncorrelated with expenses.
Cabinet members claim fewer expenses than other MPs. This makes
sense given that some of their expenses are paid separately. Moreover, their
commitments with the executive leave them less time to devote to parlia-
mentary business. We nd instead no signicant impact of shadow cabinet
membership.
Constituencies with higher voter turnout rates tend to have higher ex-
pense claims. This result is robust and holds up across a variety of speci-
cations. Interpreting this result requires some understanding of what drives
turnout. If high turnout is driven purely by ideological attachment then a
higher spending could be a symptom of a lack of accountability. However, if
turnout indicates informed participation then high spending indicates some-
thing rather di¤erent. One possibility is that an electorate that participates
more requires more attention from their MP. The fact that we control for
the marginality of the seat (which is a proxy for contestability and, therefore,
accountability) suggests that the second interpretation is more plausible. Al-
though it is hard to establish convincingly, this second interpretation relates
to Putnams (1993) study of Italian regions. Putnam claims that the e¤ec-
tiveness of governments in reecting the preferences of their citizens can be
related to social engagement and political participation. The correlation be-
tween political participation and the quality of governance in Italian regions
has recently been conrmed by Solt (2004).
In column 3 we present the results for the complete specication, when
all the explanatory variables are used. We now introduce individual charac-
teristics of MPs, i.e. their age and sex, their experience (i.e. the length of
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their service as MPs measured in years), a dummy equal to 1 if they have
a university degree and, nally, a dummy equal to 1 if their degree is from
either Oxford or Cambridge14. While the gender and having a degree do not
appear to be correlated with the amounts claimed, other personal characteris-
tics seem to have a relevant explanatory power. In particular older and more
experienced MPs claim less, and each one of these two variables appears to
have an independent impact (although the experience variable is signicant
only at the 10% level).15 Degree holders do not behave di¤erently from the
rest, but graduates of either Oxford or Cambridge spend less. Whether this
is a reection of their more privileged backgrounds or some kind of enhanced
sense of responsibility is moot.
If we want to quantify the magnitude of the various e¤ects, by using the
results of column 3 we can say that each extra mile distance fromWestminster
translates into approximately £ 31.8 per year of expenses claim, while being a
cabinet member induces, when controlling for other factors, an average claim
reduction of almost £ 9,000 per year when compared with other MPs. Each
additional year of age or experience reduces spending by, respectively, £ 283
and £ 149, while graduates from Oxford or Cambridge spend on average more
than £ 2,500 less than the rest.
Some of the variables we have used to explain expenses are related to
objective measures of need. Therefore, reporting how much an MP claims
without taking into account at least some of such needs can be misleading.
A better way to identify high spenders is instead to look at the residuals of
the regression analysis, i.e. the unexplained spending component.
Table 3 reports the unconditional top 10 spenders, where the amount
has been calculated as an average over the period considered. In table 4
we report instead the top 10 spenders as they emerge from our regressions,
i.e. using the residual as a measure. In the rst column of table 4 we
report the top 10 spenders when conditioning on constituency characteristics
alone, the minimum measure of need. Column 2 reports the top 10 spenders
when conditioning on both constituency and political characteristics, while in
14Oxford and Cambridge have a strong prominence in British political life. It is probably
su¢ cient to mention that 25 British Prime Ministers have been educated at Oxford and
13 at Cambridge. Such prominence has induced us to single out these institutions from
the other British universities.
15This could be regarded as more e¢ ciency in the use of resources by part of more
experienced MPs. In fact, the analysis of participation in parliamentary divisions will lead
us to a rather di¤erent conclusion.
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column 3 we condition on all the variables used in the regressions of Table 2.
The names listed appear to be consistently similar in all cases: ve of the top
unconditional spenders of Table 3 appear also in all columns of Table 4 (Claire
Curtis-Thomas, Paul Farrelly, Doug Henderson, Eric Joyce and Mohammad
Sarwar). There are, however, some noticeable exceptions. Andrew Dismore
is 25th in the unconditional list but always in the top four in the conditional
columns. Andrew Rosindell also appears in all conditional lists but is 17th
in the unconditional list. Some MPs appear in Table 4 despite being well
out of the spot-light in their unconditional spending (Jacqui Lait, Austin
Mitchell and Barry Gardiner, ranked respectively 56th, 59th and 67th in
unconditional spending). On the other side, some MPs are among the top
spenders for reasons that are well captured by our explanatory variables.
Alistair Carmichael, for example, is 9th in the unconditional expense ranking
but becomes 131st when conditioning on constituency characteristics and
166th when all the covariates of Table 2 are used. Again, this suggests that
plenty of caution should be used when expressing an evaluation of crudely
exposed expense claims.
4.2 Travel, sta¤ and other expenses
We now look at disaggregated spending. This makes sense since di¤erent
types of spending are subject to di¤erent rules and are likely to respond
di¤erently to constituency characteristics.
We begin with travel expenses, which appear to be mainly predicted by
constituency characteristics, with distance from Westminster having a posi-
tive impact and income and size having a negative impact. Other signicant
e¤ects are represented by the constituency turnout rate (positive) and being
a member of the cabinet (negative). Party membership and personal char-
acteristics appear to have no impact with the important exception of sex;
women MPs tend to spend less on travel, other things equal. The estimated
saving compared with male MPs is approximately £ 1,000 per annum. This
regression exhibits a relatively high R-squared, indicating that the variables
we use can explain approximately two thirds of the variation in travel spend-
ing.
Sta¤ spending presents us with a di¤erent picture.16 Distance is again
16Members of Parliament could spend up to £ 77,543 on sta¤ costs in 2003-04. As noted
before, however, sta¤ expenses show limited variation when compared to other categories.
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statistically important, although it is now only signicant at the 10% level.
It is possible that increased distance fromWestminster also requires increased
sta¤ support. Contrary to expectations, local average income and the size of
the constituency do not appear to have an impact on sta¤expenses. However,
the party a¢ liation of the MPmatters. While Conservative and Labour party
membership do not signicantly di¤er, Liberal Democrat MPs tend to spend
more than them (an average of almost £ 1,500) while other parties (mainly
the SNP and PC) tend to spend less (almost £ 4,000). However, the latter
coe¢ cient is signicant only at the 10% level. Age turns out to be correlated
with expenses older MPs spend less on sta¤. The correlation with gender
is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Finally, column 3 turns to other expenses. From the summary statistics
of Tab. 1, it is clear that this variable is more dispersed than total and
sta¤ spending. Only travel spending displays a higher variation but, as we
have seen, this is simply because of the high variability of the distance from
Westminster of the various constituencies.
Column 3 delivers signicant results and new insight into the role played
by our explanatory variables. First, constituency characteristics do not have
any impact on the usage of these allowances. There appears instead to be
a clear di¤erence in parties. Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs spend on
average more than Conservatives and other MPs. The corresponding coe¢ -
cients are highly signicant, with Labour and Liberal Democrats spending,
respectively, an average of £ 2,500 and £ 1,500 more than the Conservatives.
Older and experienced MPs also spend signicantly less an increase of one
standard deviation in the MPs age (8.6 years) implies approximately £ 1,100
lower spending in this category. The corresponding gure for experience (and
controlling for age) is approximately £ 800.
The picture that emerges from Table 3 shows that there are di¤erences
in the determinants of the various spending items. Travel expense claims
appear to be mainly driven by objective needs, linked with constituency
characteristics, in particular the distance between Westminster and electoral
constituencies. For sta¤ and other expenses, party a¢ liation and the age
and experience of an MP matter. The Liberal Democrats seem to be high
spenders on sta¤ while Labour MPs spend more on other items. The Con-
servatives appear to be lower spenders. Age and experience reduce spending,
especially other expenses.
This picture is, however, mainly descriptive, and certainly not su¢ cient to
express any normative evaluation. We will make an attempt in that direction
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when we study participation patterns and the cost per vote.
4.3 Do retiring MPs behave di¤erently?
It is well established in the political economy literature, at both the theoreti-
cal and empirical levels, that the perspective of facing re-election may induce
a di¤erent behaviour in politicians. In our case, retiring MPs are, to a certain
extent, less constrained by their relationship with constituents as compared
to MPs that will stand again. This could make a di¤erence, although in
principle it is not clear in which direction. Retiring MPs face a reduced
incentive to satisfy public morality (and therefore should spend more) but
also fewer incentives to be active in political terms (and this should lead to
less spending). If allowances are genuinely used to improve MPs activity
then we should not observe any increase in spending by retiring MPs: on the
contrary, we should expect a decrease.
Table 6 introduces a dummy variable which equals one if MPs announce
their intention to step down at the end of the Parliamentary term. The results
show that this variable has generally a negative sign on expenses17 but it is
only statistically signicant in explaining the Other expenses category (see
column 4).
Thus, in general, the di¤erence between standing and retiring MPs can
be found mainly in items like computer equipment, stationery and postage.
Some of these items can be linked with the need to maintain good contact
with voters. The sign of this coe¢ cient is negative. Thus the prospect of re-
election does appear to induce MPs to spend more. This is consistent with
the idea that money is spent in political activities rather than misappropri-
ated. The experience variable becomes less signicant in this specication,
as it is correlated with the intention to step down.
4.4 Parliamentary attendance and the cost per vote
The main purpose of providing MPs with spending allowances is arguably
that of improving the quality of the service to their constituents. Having es-
tablished that there are some specic individual and systemic characteristics
that a¤ect expense claiming, it is therefore important to determine whether
17It is positive but not signicant in the travel expenses equation.
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such expenses correspond to the amount of e¤ort expended by MPs. Parlia-
mentary attendance is the minimum that constituents can require from their
representatives. Hence, we will use this variable to measure the amount of
work delivered by MPs.
We start therefore by constructing a variable that represents the percent-
age of divisions for which the MP cast his/her vote in parliament. A total
of 876 divisions were held during the period we consider18. The attendance
variable goes therefore from zero to a theoretical maximum of 100 if an MP
voted in every division.19
The rst column of table 7 reports the OLS coe¢ cients of a regression
in which the percentage of attendance is the dependent variable and con-
stituency, political and individual characteristics are used as explanatory
variables. From this exercise we obtain a number of signicant results. First,
Labour MPs have a much higher propensity to vote. Controlling for all other
variables, an average Labour MP tends to vote in Parliament almost 6% more
than a Liberal Democrat MP, 9% more than a Conservative MP and 15%
more than an MP from another party. This is particularly striking as the
Labour party had a large majority in the parliament that we are studying.
Not surprisingly, cabinet members vote less than other MPs while female
MPs tend to vote less than their male colleagues, although only by a little
less than 3% on average. Experience reduces participation; a one standard
deviation in experience reduces voting by approximately 4.3%. This e¤ect is
of the same order of magnitude as the reduced participation for MPs who do
not intend to stand again at the next election.
It is clear that some variables a¤ect both voting and the amount of ex-
penses claimed. Thus, looking merely at parliamentary expenses to evaluate
the behaviour of politicians can be misleading. A better measure to look
at would be one that takes into account the extent of attendance. Thus
we compute the cost per vote in Parliament for each MP by dividing their
total expenses by the number of times that they voted. Excluding the basic
salary, which is the same for all MPs, this measure is derived by dividing the
total expenses claimed during the three years considered, by the number of
divisions voted during the same period (876). We obtain that the average
cost of an individual vote in parliament is £ 556. This gure, however, hides
18There are often several divisions during Report stage of a bill (and during committee,
if taken on the oor of the House). Not all votes take place on legislation.
19The speaker and deputy speakers are excluded from this analysis.
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a large variation: the cost goes from £ 257 for the cheapest MPs to £ 3,360 for
the most expensive. While the performance measure is crude, it is probably
no cruder than the kinds of performance measures that MPs themselves have
regularly voted to impose on other areas of the public sector. It would, of
course, be good to collect other data on MPs activism in future to further
assess how much the public is getting value for money.
Table 8 reports the top 10 most expensive MPs according to this criterion,
and the corresponding cost per vote. Not surprisingly, column 1 shows that
the most expensive votes in parliament, i.e. the highest ratio of expenses over
attendance, are those of members of the executive, with the Prime Minister
being the most expensive of all. In column 2 we report the same list excluding
members of the government (not only of the Cabinet). If compared with the
table of unconditional total expenses, we have a number of new names on
the list. In brackets we report the position of each MP in the unconditional
ranking of expenses. George Galloway has the highest ratio of claims per vote
among non-government members, even though he was only 333th in the list
of expense claims. Further down the list, we encounter both MPs that were
high in the expense ranking as well as MPs who passed totally unobserved,
being in the middle or even rather low in that list.
In columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 7 we estimate regressions where the cost
per vote is used as the dependent variable. From columns 2 and 3 it appears
that constituency characteristics and most political variables do not a¤ect
cost per division attended. Exceptions to this result are, as expected, cabi-
net membership and, more surprisingly, party a¢ liation. The cost of a vote
in parliament by a Conservative or a member of another party (mainly SNP
and PC) is well above the cost per vote of Labour or Liberal Democrat MPs.
This result is conrmed even in column 4, when we control for individual
characteristics. According to this last set of coe¢ cients, each vote attended
by a Conservative MP costs the taxpayer about £ 58 more than a vote at-
tended by a Labour or Liberal Democrat MP. For SNP and PC this gure
rises to £ 123. Members of cabinet are also expensive: each vote is £ 545 more
costly than that of other MPs20.
20The reimbursement of travel expenses has, more than in the other cases, the purpose
of facilitating attendance at parliamentary meetings. Hence, in separate regressions (not
reported) we consider the cost per vote when only travel expenses are included. The
results present some di¤erences, and in large part mirror the results we already found
in the expenses equations. In particular, the coe¢ cients of constituency income and sex
become negative and signicant while those of age, conservative MPs, and cabinet members
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Coming to individual characteristics, we nd no impact of gender or edu-
cation and no di¤erent behaviour by retiring MPs. Only age and experience
matter, although this time they go in di¤erent directions. Older MPs, keep-
ing constant the time already spent in parliament, spend less for each vote
delivered. One standard deviation in age implies a decreased cost of £ 28
per vote. On the other side, if we take two MPs of the same age but with
di¤erent times spent serving in parliament, the more experienced MPs are
also the more expensive. The magnitude of this e¤ect is relatively high, an
increase of one standard deviation in experience implying an increase of £ 51
in the cost of a vote.
This suggests that, on this metric, younger and less experienced MPs
give the same work (in votes cast) at the same price. For every year that
an MP stays in parliament, it appears (on average) that it costs £ 10 for
every parliamentary vote they cast. There may, of course, be other com-
pensatory benets that come from having older and more experienced MPs
which outweigh the rather narrow performance metric we have looked at.
Putting these results together, we can contrast the cost per vote of a 30
year old Labour MP who has just entered the Parliament with a 60 year
old Conservative MP with 30 years experience. Our results suggest that
the latter will (on average) claim around £ 350 more in expenses per division
attended compared to the former. To put this result in perspective, this is
an increase in the cost per vote of more than 60% of the mean cost. If the
latter comparator were from the SNP, the gure would be around £ 420 more
per division attended.
5 Conclusion
The question of whether MPs allowances help to deliver an e¤ectively func-
tioning legislature is both interesting and important. The popular press
were quick to cite expense claims as part of a Westminster gravy train. But
there are many benign factors that shape expense claims which need to be
controlled for before jumping to conclusions. Our study suggests that, when
reporting expenses in future, there should be some e¤ort to do so making
become insignicant. This indicates that both cabinet members and conservatives MPs
do not overspend in travelling and that that the reduction in cost per vote associated with
age is not driven by less travelling but rather by reduced usage of other items.
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due allowance for objective features of constituencies.21
We nd that constituency characteristics (such as distance from West-
minster) do predict expense claims. This reinforces the point that expenses
level the playing eld between MPs with di¤erent circumstances. However,
we also nd some unexpected results that require more investigation. They
include the patterns of party di¤erences and the signicance of constituency
level turnout in predicting expense claims. Of the individual characteris-
tics, we nd understandable patterns in age and experience. The fact that
Oxbridge educated MPs spend less is less easily explicable. Our ndings for
retiring MPs also merit further study.
The metric of cost per division attended yields particularly interesting
ndings. Here, the political life-cycle was shown to be important. There
are also substantial di¤erences between the parties in the expenses charged
compared to attendance in Parliament. While there may be good reasons
not to vote especially in a Parliament where one party has a large majority
it is a matter of public interest to monitor all aspects of the performance
of public servants and to assess the value for money they o¤er.
One undoubted reaction to our analysis will be in terms of the narrowness
of the perspective that we have taken in terms of evaluating MPsperfor-
mances. However, many who make their livelihood in the public services will
recognize in this a parallel with many recent e¤orts by parliament to regulate
public services. This has focused on a few easily measurable targets that
sometimes have questionable merit and have been argued to divert attention
away from what really matters. Up until now MPs have not themselves
been subject to performance targets. But this does raise the wider issue of
whether (as public servants) they should. In this regard, one thing is certain
we now have the data to help implement them.
21This is similar to the argument that value added scores are more relevant than exam
scores in assessing school performance.
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6 Data Appendix: denitions and sources
6.1 MPsAllowance Expenditure
The data on expenses claims have been released under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act by the Parliament and are available at the following web page:
http://www.parliament.uk/site_information/allowances.cfm. The following
description of expense allowances are taken from the House of Commons web
page:
A. Additional Costs Allowance (ACA)
This is paid to reimburse Members for necessary costs incurred when
staying overnight away from their main home for the purpose of performing
parliamentary duties. Inner London Members do not receive this allowance.
Until February 2004, Ministers and certain paid o¢ ce holders were deemed
to have their main home in London and could claim this allowance only for
overnight stays in the constituency.
B. London Supplement
Inner London Members receive the London Supplement instead of the
ACA. Outer London Members may choose between the ACA and the London
Supplement. Ministers who do not live in o¢ cial accommodation and certain
o¢ ce holders automatically receive the London Supplement with their salary.
London Supplement is subject to income tax and national insurance.
C. Incidental Expenses Provision (IEP)
This is paid to meet the costs of accommodation for o¢ ce or surgery use;
equipment and supplies for o¢ ce or surgery; work commissioned or other
services; and certain travel and communications.
D. Sta¢ ng Allowance
This is paid to enable Members to engage sta¤. The IEP can also be used
to cover certain sta¤ related costs. The Sta¢ ng Allowance varies according
to the number of sta¤ based in London. London Members automatically
receive the higher gure.
E.MembersTravel
This is the total cost of travel on parliamentary business within the UK
plus certain European travel. Members travel does not include travel on
parliamentary delegation business or select committee visits.
Certain elements of the travel allowances are taxable. More information
about the various categories of travel and transport can be found on the
Parliament web page.
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F.MembersSta¤Travel
Until December 2003 Each Member was allowed a total of eighteen single
journeys per calendar year betweenWestminster and the constituency, shared
by all employees. This increased to 30 single journeys for the period 1 January
2004 to 30 March 2005.
G1. Centrally Purchased Stationery
This column sets out the cost of stationery items ordered from a central
supplier. This includes stationery with prepaid postage for use in direct
connection with a Members parliamentary duties; the House of Commons is
charged separately for the associated postage costs.
The gures given for each Member for 2001-02 and 2002-03 do not include
any postage costs. The gures for 2003-04 include the postage costs for each
Member.
G2. Postage Associated with the use of Centrally Purchased
Stationery (2003-04 only)
This column sets out the cost of postage associated with the use of sta-
tionery with prepaid postage ordered from the central supplier for use in
direct connection with a Members parliamentary duties.
H. Centrally Provided Computer Equipment
This column sets out the cost of equipment supplied on loan to each
Member. The provision allows for up to one laptop, three desktop PCs,
two CD rewriters and one or two printers, depending on the specication
required. The costs show the asset value spread over a four-year period.
I. Other Costs
This column sets out costs incurred from central budgets, including the
temporary secretarial allowance which pays for additional help when sta¤are
absent due to sickness or maternity leave; central contributions to security
costs for the o¢ ce; exceptional needs support (from March 2004) which pro-
vides for short term additional help to Members whose constituencies have
particular problems; ill-health retirement grant; and winding-up allowance
payable to defeated or retiring Members or representatives of deceased Mem-
bers after the date on which they cease to be Members of Parliament.
The aggregates used in the regressions are dened as follows (all variables
are expressed as annual averages):
 Total: the sum of all expenses.
 Travel: E +F
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 Sta¤: D
 Other: C+G1+G2+H+I
6.2 Parliamentary attendance
Attendance is constructed from parliamentary division information provided
by Firth and Spirling (2003). The total attendance variable measures the
number of divisions for which an MP cast her/his vote during the period
June 2001-March 2004. The percentage attendance variable is measured as
(total attendance 100)=876
where 876 is the total number of divisions (votes) in the period considered.
Cost per vote is measured as the total expenses claimed in the period
March 2001 - June 2004 divided by the number of divisions attended by an
MP.
These variables do not include the speaker and deputy speakers of the
House of Commons.
6.3 Other variables
 The variables regarding the size of the electorate (number of potential
voters), turnout (percentage of actual voters) and marginality (dummy
equal to 1 for constituencies in which the winning party had less than
10% lead over the runner up in the 2001 general election) have been
taken from the British Parliamentary Constituency Database, compiled
and edited by Pippa Norris and available at
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm.
 The distance of a constituency from Westminster is measured in miles
and is referred to the main town in each constituency. It has been
derived from the AA website.
 Income is taken from the O¢ ce for National Statistics and it is dis-
aggregated at the level NUTS 2. NUTS stands for Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for Statistics and is a subdivision of the UK devised
by Eurostat. NUTS 2 corresponds, although imperfectly, to counties.
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 Information on individual characteristics, party a¢ liation, cabinet and
shadow cabinet membership have been collected by the authors using
various sources. Conservative, Labour, Lib-Dem and Other Party are
dummy variables equal to one when the MP is a member of the named
party. Cabinet membership (and shadow cabinet membership) has been
constructed as the share of time (with units expressed in months) dur-
ing which the MP has been a member of cabinet (or the shadow cabi-
net) in the period June 2001-March 2004. Gender is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for female MPs. Age is expressed in years and refers to
the age in the year 2001. Experience is expressed as the number of
years already spent in parliament by an MP at the moment of her/his
election in 2001. Degree is a dummy variable equal to 1 for MPs that
have obtained a university degree. Oxbridge is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the degree has been obtained from either Oxford or Cambridge
University. Retiring is a dummy equal to 1 for MPs that, at any point
during the 2001-2005 legislature, announced their intention not to be
candidate in the next general election.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total claims 638 105849.3 11772.25 62264.67 138717.7
Travel expenses 638 10354.12 6259.1 0 39637.33
Staff expenses 638 58546.44 5836.669 35214.33 72189.34
Other expenses 638 21206.71 4695.632 5792.669 40158.34
Distance 639 147.8326 132.2461 0 702
Income 639 15625.47 2246.883 12913 19641
Size 639 67389.44 8583.635 21807 106305
Conservative 639 .258216 .4379962 0 1
Labour 639 .6416275 .479898 0 1
Liberal-Democratic 639 .0829421 .2760107 0 1
Other party 639 .0156495 .1242123 0 1
Cabinet member 639 .031205 .1638036 0 1
Shadow Cab. Member 639 0.0354617 .1630087 0 1
Turnout 639 58.97622 6.392356 34.08262 72.27435
Marginal 639 .1924883 .3945633 0 1
Gender 639 .1784038 .3831522 0 1
Age 639 50.12363 8.656926 29 79
Experience 639 8.061033 7.470173 0 39
Degree 639 .7887324 .4085276 0 1
Oxbridge 638 .2601881 .4390813 0 1
Retiring 639 .1298905 .3364462 0 1
Attendance (perc.) 634 69.01791 13.21894 7.762557 93.94977
Attendance (total) 634 604.5969 115.7979 68 823
Cost per Vote 634 556.4027 215.4933 257.292 3360.059
Table 2: Total average claims per year (2001-04)
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Total claims Total claims Total claims
Distance 41.087 32.581 31.303
(4.62)*** (3.56)*** (3.53)***
Income -0.261 -0.481 -0.527
(0.61) (1.07) (1.19)
Size 0.027 -0.031 -0.014
(0.39) (0.46) (0.21)
Conservatives -1,881.664 -436.544
(1.42) (0.33)
Liberal-Democratic -1,053.328 -1,222.235
(0.77) (0.86)
Other Party 938.230 -1,605.525
(0.23) (0.39)
Cabinet Member -10,404.230 -8,865.197
(3.56)*** (2.85)***
Shadow Cab. Member 520.634 -122.208
(0.19) (0.04)
Marginal seat 1,532.540 861.041
(1.36) (0.78)
Turnout 310.216 208.211
(3.35)*** (2.24)**
Gender -1,074.762
(1.04)
Age -277.605
(4.99)***
Experience -151.481
(1.94)*
Degree 144.327
(0.14)
Oxbridge -2,572.763
(2.44)**
Constant 102,054.540 92,919.207 114,332.524
(11.91)*** (10.65)*** (12.67)***
Observations 638 638 638
R-squared 0.17 0.22 0.29
All regressions contain 11 dummy variables for the standard regions 
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Top 10 spenders (average 2001-2004)
Member Constituency Amount
Eric Joyce Falkirk West 138,718
Claire Curtis-Thomas Crosby 137,891
Angus Robertson Moray 135,335
Mohammad Sarwar Glasgow Govan 134,720
Peter Duncan Galloway & Upper Nithsdale 133,447
Paul Farrelly Newcastle-under-Lyme 131,851
Doug Henderson Newcastle upon Tyne North 131,354
Anne Picking East Lothian 131,109
Alistair Carmichael Orkney & Shetland 130,929
Jim Sheridan Renfrewshire West 130,908
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Table 5: Travel, staff and other expenses
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Travel Staff Other
Distance 18.983 7.683 3.130
(4.71)*** (1.70)* (0.94)
Income -0.441 0.245 -0.146
(3.19)*** (1.09) (0.77)
Size -0.053 0.033 0.022
(2.33)** (1.07) (0.68)
Conservative 34.094 742.866 -2,380.012
(0.08) (1.15) (4.42)***
Liberal-Democratic -548.978 1,549.347 -905.268
(0.91) (2.37)** (1.55)
Other Party 1,246.412 -3,809.924 -32.463
(0.95) (1.93)* (0.01)
Cabinet Member -6,571.627 -3,079.584 -337.827
(6.44)*** (1.61) (0.30)
Shadow Cab. Member 397.550 -491.733 -48.667
(0.33) (0.33) (0.07)
Marginal Seat 110.157 90.067 80.714
(0.28) (0.18) (0.18)
Turnout 72.403 -35.981 81.254
(2.02)** (0.85) (2.17)**
Gender -1,012.838 228.055 447.719
(2.54)** (0.44) (1.05)
Age -4.444 -89.547 -142.837
(0.21) (3.26)*** (5.82)***
Experience -13.658 26.042 -120.598
(0.53) (0.61) (3.61)***
Degree -609.858 665.913 268.633
(1.44) (1.30) (0.67)
Oxbridge -412.208 -585.157 -502.667
(1.13) (1.09) (1.15)
Constant 15,023.799 57,209.357 25,428.286
(5.01)*** (13.27)*** (6.65)***
Observations 638 638 638
R-squared 0.65 0.26 0.26
All regressions contain 11 dummy variables for the standard regions 
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Do retiring MPs behave differently?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Total Travel Staff Other
Distance 31.491 18.940 7.758 3.281
(3.55)*** (4.69)*** (1.71)* (0.99)
Income -0.535 -0.439 0.243 -0.152
(1.21) (3.18)*** (1.08) (0.81)
Size -0.019 -0.052 0.030 0.017
(0.29) (2.26)** (0.99) (0.55)
Conservatives -526.617 54.867 707.127 -2,452.128
(0.40) (0.12) (1.09) (4.56)***
Liberal-Democratic -1,256.517 -541.072 1,535.745 -932.715
(0.88) (0.90) (2.33)** (1.63)
Other parties -1,835.131 1,299.365 -3,901.025 -216.295
(0.45) (0.98) (1.98)** (0.09)
Cabinet Member -9,145.673 -6,506.941 -3,190.869 -562.388
(2.94)*** (6.37)*** (1.67)* (0.50)
Shadow Cab. Member
-377.824 456.502 -593.155 -253.324
(0.14) (0.38) (0.40) (0.36)
Marginal Seat 913.688 98.015 110.956 122.866
(0.83) (0.25) (0.22) (0.28)
Turnout 212.257 71.470 -34.376 84.493
(2.28)** (2.00)** (0.81) (2.25)**
Gender -958.822 -1,039.577 274.057 540.546
(0.93) (2.60)*** (0.54) (1.27)
Age -262.052 -8.031 -83.376 -130.384
(4.69)*** (0.36) (3.04)*** (5.37)***
Experience -137.028 -16.991 31.776 -109.027
(1.72)* (0.66) (0.73) (3.22)***
Degree 108.979 -601.705 651.888 240.332
(0.10) (1.42) (1.27) (0.60)
Oxbridge -2,472.154 -435.411 -545.238 -422.115
(2.34)** (1.18) (1.03) (0.97)
Retiring -2,045.862 471.833 -811.742 -1,637.998
(1.46) (1.03) (1.15) (3.22)***
Constant 113,924.723 15,117.850 57,047.552 25,101.785
(12.73)*** (5.02)*** (13.24)*** (6.66)***
Observations 638 638 638 638
R-squared 0.29 0.65 0.26 0.28
All regressions contain 11 dummy variables for the standard regions 
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7: Parliamentary Attendance and Cost per Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Attendance Cost per Vote Cost per Vote Cost per Vote
Distance 0.013 0.219 0.119 0.084
(1.46) (1.39) (0.91) (0.69)
Income 0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008
(0.71) (0.01) (0.94) (1.16)
Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.61) (0.51) (0.76) (0.34)
Conservatives -8.596 71.364 53.558
(6.55)*** (4.64)*** (3.11)***
Liberal-Democratic -4.735 17.639 16.433
(2.77)*** (0.84) (0.76)
Other Party -14.339 122.497 123.291
(4.45)*** (2.64)*** (2.86)***
Cabinet Member -28.541 571.835 544.453
(6.60)*** (2.90)*** (2.85)***
Shadow cab. Member -4.674 34.820 30.720
(2.14)** (1.12) (0.96)
Marginal Seat -0.843 4.380 11.047
(0.81) (0.34) (0.89)
Turnout 0.017 1.062 2.196
(0.15) (0.52) (1.06)
Gender -2.880 13.993
(2.24)** (0.76)
Age 0.085 -3.177
(1.25) (3.38)***
Experience -0.597 6.760
(7.66)*** (5.14)***
Degree -0.654 -8.632
(0.53) (0.50)
Oxbridge -0.978 -0.124
(0.91) (0.01)
Retiring -3.988 19.419
(2.51)** (0.88)
Constant 64.221 557.557 586.251 629.156
(6.20)*** (4.98)*** (4.81)*** (4.57)***
Observations 634 634 634 634
R-squared 0.36 0.05 0.25 0.28
All regressions contain 11 dummy variables for the standard regions 
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Tab 8: The most expensive votes in parliament (2001-2004)
(1) (2)
Unconditional Cost Excluding government members Cost
1 Tony Blair 3360 George Galloway (333) 1491
2 Gordon Brown 3114 Gwineth Dunwoody (450) 1187
3 Jack Straw 2043 Michael Mates (296) 1070
4 Brian Wilson 1596 Alex Salmond (15) 1043
5 George Galloway 1491 Nigel Jones (403) 1012
6 Clare Short 1260 Claire Curtis-Thomas (2) 967
7 Jane Kennedy 1243 Peter Duncan (5) 929
8 Gwyneth Dunwoody 1187 Alan Meale (37) 922
9 Michael Mates 1070 Angus Robertson (3) 900
10 Alex Salmond 1043 Debra Shipley (197) 843
In column 2 we report in brackets the position in the total expense ranking. 
